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in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

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extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).